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Abstract: Threat assessment is the continuous process of monitoring the threats identified in the
network of the real-time informational environment of an organisation and the business of the compa-
nies. The sagacity and security assurance for the system of an organisation and company’s business
seem to need that information security exercise to unambiguously and effectively handle the threat
agent’s attacks. How is this unambiguous and effective way in the present-day state of information
security practice working? Given the prevalence of threats in the modern information environment,
it is essential to guarantee the security of national information infrastructure. However, the existing
models and methodology are not addressing the attributes of threats like motivation, opportunity,
and capability (C, M, O), and the critical threat intelligence (CTI) feed to the threat agents during the
penetration process is ineffective, due to which security assurance arises for an organisation and the
business of companies. This paper proposes a semi-automatic information security model, which can
deal with situational awareness data, strategies prevailing information security activities, and proto-
cols monitoring specific types of the network next to the real-time information environment. This
paper looks over analyses and implements the threat assessment of network traffic in one particular
real-time informational environment. To achieve this, we determined various unique attributes of
threat agents from the Packet Capture Application Programming Interface (PCAP files/DataStream)
collected from the network between the years 2012 and 2019. We used hypothetical and real-world
examples of a threat agent to evaluate the three different factors of threat agents, i.e., Motivation,
Opportunity, and Capability (M, O, C). Based on this, we also designed and determined the threat
profiles, critical threat intelligence (CTI), and complexity of threat agents that are not addressed or
covered in the existing threat agent taxonomies models and methodologies.
Keywords: threat agents; motivation; opportunity; capability; user profiling; implicit; modeling;
real-time user monitoring; complexity threat agent; threat assessment
1. Introduction
Identifying the potential cybersecurity threat capability in real-time is a crucial ac-
tivity. It helps provide practical information about the threat in a network that allows
cybersecurity practitioners to take suitable action to mitigate the risk in a network [1].
Elaborating all the information about the potential cybersecurity threats of an organisation
is typically achieved manually by the existing models and methodology. Threat assessment
is implemented in an automated manner with the help of machine learning techniques
and various real-time models [2]. The behaviours of threat agents are erratic, and the
goals of threat agents change with time. Threat agent groups change their behaviour to
penetrate a network based on motivation, opportunity, and capability [3,4]. The motivation
of the threat agent constantly changes with time depends on the financial gain, revenge
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from an organisation, etc., and the type of environment targeted. Profiling is a process
that generates a profile for the threat agents based on the historical information extracted
from the Packet Capture Application Programming Interface (PCAP) files captured in
a network with the help of penetration testing phases. The profile can be populated by
having suitable, ample, and precise information about the threat agent like behaviour,
source I.P. address, destination I.P. address, number of open ports, number of packets
generated, location of the threat agent, and time spent on the network with minimal user
intervention [5]. The user has minimal intervention because of the footprints captured
by the capturing data tool like LibPcap, WinPcap, PCAPng, NPcap, etc., during threat
assessment in the form of PCAP files that cannot be altered by the potential threat agent
while traversing an organisation’s network. The threat agent cannot alter because once
they generate the packets in the network, they cannot erase the footprint of generating
the packets because of the accessing property of the network. This research attempts to
recognise the aspects of profiling and deliver solutions by implementing the profiling of
threat agents. Threat profiling is an essential aspect of performing threat assessment for an
organisation. Suppose we have the threat profile for the historically identified threat agents
from the network of an organisation. In that case, we can use these profiles as references
while executing the threat assessment for the situational awareness data captured from
the network. The model can address the recent threat agent effectively identified from a
network with optimised complexity.
It has been accepted that continuous threat assessments practice mitigate the risks
for any organisation and business [6]. However, in the modern, socially driven, virtual
computing era, threat assessments are hindered by a lack of resources, complexity, and data
size [7]. Information Environments are large heterogeneous infrastructures, hosting a large
amount of data collected from different types of sensors and platforms [8]. To cope with
a large amount of data, decision aid tools should understand the situational awareness
property of data and threat assessments required for an organisation. University computer
emergency response team (CMU-CERT) groups determined three critical groups of threat
agents, i.e., the technology of organisation sabotage, compromising with intellectual prop-
erty, and data stream fraud [9]. The number of growing cases highlighted by internet media
in recent years revealed that both business organisations and government organisations
suffered a similar experience. In contrast, the priority information has been filtrated by
the organisation’s internal users and shared with the threat agents [10]. The threat agents
require serious attention from both users and organisations.
Referencing to the COVID-19 pandemic nowadays, organisations and businesses
share their file and documents frequently with the help of the internet to run their business.
It is now standard practice for users of the organisation to have admittance to large
repository documents which are electronically warehoused on distributed file servers.
Many organisations offer company laptops and desktops to the users for work while
using e-mail to organise and schedule/rescheduling meetings. Amenities such as video
conferencing are repeatedly used for holding meetings throughout the world, and users of
an organisation are continuously connected to the internet. The electronic nature of the
files and records of an organisation on the internet makes it easier for the threat agents
to attack the organisation. On the advantageous side of continuous threat assessment, an
organisation can easily capture the activity logs of the internal threat agent while analysing
their captured packets [11]. However, practically analysing such activity logs is infeasible
due to the high volume of activities performed by the user every day.
In this work, we present an efficient model for threat detection and analysis based
on the conception of anomaly detection. The proposed model implements the threat
agent profiles from the PCAP files and determines the cyber threat intelligence based
on evaluating motivation, opportunity, and capability of threats. With the help of these
profiles, comparisons can be populated that show the current observations fluctuate from
the previous observations. To assess the performance of the tactic, we extracted the
valuable information from the PCAP files in a semi-automated manner, and output has
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been generated in the form of an Excel sheet which consists of various attributes of threat
agents identified in the next to the real-world information environment. The system
executed expressively soundly for detecting the attacks, and the visualisation of reports
enabled us to remember which attributes help determine M, O, C factors for the threat
agents. This paper illustrates all the threats identified in a network captured during the
penetration testing against the ESXi server of the University of Hertfordshire, UK.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work. Section 3
labels the necessities of analysis, the experimental set-up of the proposed system, and de-
scribes how to evaluate motivation, capability, and opportunity of threat agents. Section 4
presents the actual results from practical experimentation of the system, and Section 5
concludes this paper.
2. Related Work
The field of threat agents profiling and analysis of cyber threat intelligence has recently
received ample attention. Researchers have proposed an assortment of different models
and methodologies designed to detect or prevent attacks [12,13]. Likewise, Vidalis et al. [8]
briefly addresses the TAME (Threat Assessments Model For EPS) methodology for threat
assessments in real-time informational environments and provides a high-level overview
of its phases and process while performing threat assessments. They compare the TAME
(Threat Assessments Model For EPS) methodology with other existing methods based on
the number of parameters as sting, effectiveness, and understanding of information security
from the threat. TAME is the upgraded version of METEORE 2000 for the micropayment
system (MPS). In the initial phases, the authors analyse the number of methodologies
like Alberts 1999, 2001, Baker 1998, Bayne 2002, Blyth 2003, Dimitrakos 2001, Forte 2000,
Hancock 1998, Jones 2002, Nichols 2001, etc., and they found that all are working on the
waterfall model principle, but such approach is not suitable for the Micro Payment System
(MPS). So, they developed a new methodology i.e., TAME (Threat Assessments Model For
EPS) which has ability to resolve the issues related to Micro Payment System (MPS). TAME
(Threat Assessments Model For EPS) is working simultaneously in four phases named as:
(a) Scope of Assessments.
(b) Threat Agent and Vulnerability Analysis.
(c) Scenario Construction and System Modelling.
(d) Evaluation.
According to these phases, TAME determined how much security is required for a
particular organisation and business of the system. All four stages are working simultane-
ously, and one input from a phase becomes the output of another degree. Similarly, the
vice-versa of inputs and outputs are generated from the TAME, and it depends on the
requirements of threat assessments. The authors conclude the TAME by using the assessor
as an asset for better understanding and analysing an organisation’s systems.
Morakis et al. [14] measure vulnerabilities and their exploitation cycle by various tools
such as COPS, NESSUS, SYSTEM SCANNER, RETINA, NET RECON, WHISKER, and
CYBER COB. In this work, the authors address a problem faced by a large amount of data
in the informative environment is cyber-attacks. The authors propose a vulnerability tree
analysis to address such issues faced by several organisations for a long time. They believe
in constructing knowledge information concerning a specific domain in an object-oriented
hierarchy tree and building a formal model to analyse them concerning possible scenarios
of attacks faced by the computer systems. The primary purpose of this is to provide a depth
classification of vulnerabilities, find why such attacks happened on a particular data/asset,
and analyse footprints and scenarios of threat agents to exploit vulnerabilities. The main
aim of the vulnerability tree analysis is to identify the attacks in the early stages and
address them before severe damage to real-world informational systems. Here, the authors
illustrate the various tools capable of analysing the vulnerability of complex organisational
environments; such tools are COPS, NESSUS, SYSTEM SCANNER, RETINA, NET RECON,
WHISKER, and CYBER COB, etc. However, these are not adequate in today’s modern
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electronic era of cyber-crime because they cannot address hazards like fault-tree analysis,
checklists, event-tree analysis, cause-consequences analysis, etc. To cope with such hazards,
the authors combine these tools of vulnerabilities tree analysis with object-oriented trees
(O.O.) and adequately address such hazards concerning Boolean Mathematics.
Gerald L. et al. [15] briefly explain about threat agents regarding how they can have
unauthorised access to the computer systems of real-world informational environments
and from where they got the motivation, capability, and opportunity to perform such
damage in the networks systems. Here, they also illustrate the threat agents and their
attributes, function, and impact on a network of informational systems. The authors also
analyse the digital attacks that occured in 2002 in several countries. They identify that the
threat agents of real-world informational environments consist of:
(a) Threat agent catalogue.
(b) Historical data.
(c) Technical report enterprises.
(d) Reports of business environments.
(e) Reports of physical environments.
(f) Recent knowledge/information.
(g) Current knowledge of stakeholders.
(h) Current knowledge of the staff.
(i) List of stakeholders.
The authors evaluate the capabilities, motivation, opportunities, and impact with the
help of 3-dimension matrix mathematics. They assess each factor with the help of metrics
and ESA (Empowered Small Agents) threat agents. They identify that because of threat
agents in 2002, the European union’s worldwide economic damage is USD 35 million.
So, as the damage cost is relatively more, the system security officer needs to require all
knowledge and information about the threat agents or risk management to secure the
system from damage done by cyber-attacks in informational environments.
Adetorera Sogbesan et al. [16] developed a model to identify the MERIT (Management
& Education of Risk of Insider Threat) based on the study of insider threat concerning the
institute of CERT/USSS. This MERIT provides the facility to mitigate the insider threat
of an organisation, and the key finding is to make the case study of individual threat
agents, i.e., collision threat. MERIT models the case studies on the insider threat for an
organisation, and based on that, threat assessments have been conducted to determine
the impact of danger on the business. They also show some figures for losses based on
studies done by USSS/CERT. They categorise the insider attack based on the ex-employee,
or the financial gain of any vital position held by an employee in an organisation. Based
on the number of organisations, 69% of companies measured stated data theft events (not
external attacks). These threats were originated from inside the organisation. At the same
time, a massive 91% of companies testified not having operative detection systems for
recognising an insider threat. The MERIT model has a limitation/shortcoming in analysing
compressive pattern analysis based on motivation and behavioural characteristics. The
motivation factor of collusion attack is not able to be addressed by the MERIT model. This
model is not able to explain the capability of an insider threat.
Casillo, M. et al.’s study [17] “Embedded Intrusion Detection System for Detecting
Attacks over CAN-BUS” designs a model based on AIC (availability, integrity, and con-
fidentiality). The authors address the issues related to cyber-attacks on the automotive
vehicle system. They introduce the automotive IDS embedded method for the CAN (con-
trolled area network) BUS. Referencing the Bayesian network approaches, identifying
malicious messages to the connected devices to the vehicles is accomplished. In this paper,
the authors identify the snag for the IoT devices connected to automotive vehicles and
their attacks while using automation. They suggest machine learning approaches, particu-
larly the Bayesian network approach to cope with the cyber-attacks on the CAB bus. The
authors used the CARLA simulator to provides the solution. The PYTHON library and
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several APIs were cast off for clustering the data and FPGA techniques for developing the
model’s architecture.
Lombardi, M. et al.’s research [18] “EIDS: Embedded intrusion detection system using
machine learning to detect attack over the can-bus” introduced an IDS approach to identify
the threats in the automated vehicles, particularly CAN (controlled area network) bus. The
authors cast off the development of an IDS approach with the help of machine learning
techniques through the Bayesian network approach to detect possible attacks on the CAN
bus. The main benefit of developing an IDS approach was using the embedded framework
for designing and determining the non-linear messages flow. The castigate faced by the
connected IoT devices and the intelligent device for self-driving vehicles was identified
with the help of an introduce IDS approach in the research.
These related works draw an intense observation that access to a real-world data
stream is enormously challenging. Thus, researchers synthesise data into several groups
based on the threat agents identified in a network. The existing model and methodology
did threat assessment manually, due to which their complexity is exorbitant. This research
predominantly wants to epitomise the volume and variety of data analysed in a modern
real-world information environment and display how this could be pooled to form an
overall threat assessment for each PCAP file. We also want to exhibit a wide range of threat
scenarios as epitomised by our data collected from a real-world in a specific environment
and show how our profiling and CTI system of threat agents would detect the different
attacks based on the patterns identified.
3. Experiment Set-Up and Evaluation of MCO Attributes
The work described in this research has been carried out as part of a more comprehen-
sive interdisciplinary project that includes computer security researchers and cyberpsy-
chology experts. CTI data–driven threat agent profiling can be used for determining the
motivation, opportunity, and capabilities attributes of threat agents under the context of a
continuous threat assessment [19]. The threat remains of budding apprehension to govern-
ments and businesses organisation, and it becomes an acute necessity for practical tools to
help mitigate the threat posed. The modern risk assessment models recognise a need to
perform several threat assessments to identify and analyse various threats in the contempo-
rary information environment. If we conduct iterative threat assessment for the network,
then with the help of designing the profiling prepared by practitioners, a new type of threat
agents identified in situational awareness data will be addressed quickly. The continuous
threat assessments help generate the paradox of warning to the cyber operations performed
in the information environment. This paper identifies the research gap in semi-automated
information environments, which consists of large heterogeneous infrastructures, hosting
a large amount of data collected from different types of platforms or environments [20].
The different types of platforms mean different kinds of environment and the conditions
used by the threat agent to attack the particular network. To identify the solution for such
a large amount of data, decision aid tools should understand situational awareness and
critical intelligence feeds of the threats in real-time information environments.
In the modern knowledge-based, socially driven, virtual computing era, threat assess-
ments are hindered by lack of resources, complexity, and data size. Information environ-
ments are large heterogeneous infrastructures, hosting a large amount of data collected
from different platforms with the help of many tools. The purpose of the research paper is
to introduce a novel approach that will enable us to take advantage of the vast amount of
data collected by the large number of platforms designed to identify suspicious traffic, ma-
licious intentions, and network attacks in an automated manner. State of the art on threat
assessment models and methodologies will be considered in this project, while procedural
and technology issues will be resolved by applying cyber analytics principles [21].
Electronics 2021, 10, 1849 6 of 18
3.1. Experimental Environment of the System
Figure 1 shows the testing set-up through which we execute the penetration testing
against the specific condition of the platform or environment. The number of VPNs used to
connect with the REDNET network and connect through the firewall saves the data from
unauthorised access. Further, REDNET connects to DMZ (Demilitarized Zone), the number
of V.M.s, and public I.P. of staff to control the activities. BLUENET connects to the user’s
V.M.’s I.P.s, ESXi server, UH CSC WIFI (University of Hertfordshire Wi-Fi), and public I.P.
of staff. In this environment, the PCAP files are collected from the server with the help of
the Wireshark tool [22]. Other tools like SolarWinds Deep Packet Inspection and Analysis,
Paessler Packet Capture, ManageEngine NetFlow Analyzer, Omnipeek Network Protocol
Analyzer, TCPdump, and WinDum, etc. are also available. Still, Wireshark is more efficient
in extracting useful information from PCAP files and provides the advantage of saving
the information in CSV formats. Figure 1 shows the source of the attack I.P. address and
the destination of the attack I.P. address through which penetration is executing on the
network. The role of DMZ is to stop the hacker at the threshold point, and henceforth, no
one is allowed to do access excluded the administrator of the server [23]. The BLUENET
refers to the internal security team that defends against real-world attackers. Red Teams of
REDNET are internal/external entities dedicated to testing the effectiveness of a security
program by emulating the tools and techniques of likely attackers in the most realistic
way possible.
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3.2. The Architecture of System
The primary purpose of Figure 2 is to understand how the attacker groups generate
traffic in the network, increase a delay time to upload the web page and extract useful
information from the server such as user credentials, webpages I.P. addresses, and accessing
the files from the databases. The architecture in Figure 2 shows that the ESXi server consists
of RED, BLUE, and BLACK NET HP-DL380 ESXi VM WARE CD, DNS, DHCP, which is
further connected to the Blue ESXi security zone, and DMZ (Demilitarised Security Zone).
In this server, all the data and information of the University of Hertfordshire are available,
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and a dedicated environment installed on V.M.s is available for the attackers. Black ESXi
connected to 27 x juniper srx240 and srx340 firewalls via 27 x lab system multiple images
of the environment and dedicated interface in red, blue, and black networks. DMZ’s role is
to stop the hacker at the threshold point to control further damage by the attacker groups.
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cation, a d threat agent’s footprint at ributes play prominent role in the cal u ation [24].
In Figure 3, the representation of main characteristi s in a 3-dimensional matrix is shown,
which needs to b addressed by th model whil performing threat assessm nts of the
real-time network.
A threat assessment is a statement of threats related to vulnerabilities of company
assets and threat agents and a message of believed capabilities that those threat agents
possess. In Equation (1), the function threat can be calculated with the help of the threat
agent’s motivation, capability, opportunity, and the impact of the successful attacks on an
organisation of the nation.
Threat = f (Motivation, Capability, Opportunity, and Impact) (1)
The threat can be evaluated in the above Equation (1) when the extracted attribute
from the PCAP files is analysed. Then, based on the analysis of characteristics, motivation
evaluation can be achieved. Similarly, when the model identifies the open port and the
vulnerable ports from the extracted attributes, opportunity can be evaluated. In the same
way, the model amalgamating all the information of motivation and opportunity leads to
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assess the capability and impact on the assets by the threats. So, the function (f ) can be
evaluated using motivation, opportunity, capability, and impact of acquisitions.
F(X) = f (Cap, Opp, Mto, V(VIA)) Y + f (Vulnerability)Asset + Impact + T (2)
From Equation (2), the function F(X) represents the threat assessment of the model
for all the captured files, Cap stands for capabilities, Opp is an opportunity of the threat
agent, Mto is motivation, V(VIA) stands for the value of intangible assets, Y is for threat
assessments, and T stands for time complexity.
The threat assessment can be evaluated by amalgamating all results determined by the
function for the motivation, opportunity, capability of threat agents, and value of intangible
assets of environments. Similarly, vulnerability exploitation of assets concerning the CVE
list available on the Nation Institute of standard and technology (NIST) database, the
impact of threat agents on an organisation’s assets, and the time complexity to evaluate all
the parameters of the threat agents can be assessed.
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3.3.1. Motivation
The evaluation of motivation for threats is the problematic part. I c uld be determined
with the help of nalysis of hacktiv sm branded attacks by groups of assessment models and
the etwork’s vul er bility in next to real-time semi-automated information environments.
The motivati ns of ttackers are constantly changing, and it could be noticed by the
growing rate of hacktivism attacks by different groups of people. It can also see differences
in unique motivations based on each group. Motivation is the degree to which a threat
agent is prepared to implement a threat. The motivational factors are the elements that
drive a threat agent to consider attacking a computer system. Some common motivations
for threats include [25]:
a. Profit (direct or indirect).
b. Direct grudge.
c. Fun / Reputation.
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3.3.2. Capability
The capability of threats is determined by analysing risk assessment models and the
network vulnerability in a next to real-time semi-automated information environment [15].
Risk = (Threat) + (Vulnerability) + (Consequences) (3)
In Equation (3), the risk of the threat agent can be evaluated by the combination
of threats, the vulnerability identified for the threat concerning the CVE list of the NIST
database and identified consequences of the threat agents.
Threat = Intent × Capability (4)
Similarly, in Equation (4), the capability of the threat will be evaluated by the multipli-
cation of intention of the threat agents determined by the model and the overall capability
of the threat agent. Further, vulnerability exploitation is achieved with the help of several
kali Linux tools such as NESSUS, SAINTS, WHISKER, SARA, etc. The initial phase of
the automatic version of the threat assessment model is collecting the DataStream/ PCAP
files from the server, which has been achieved by the administration of the server between
2012 to 2019. This data mainly consists of PCAP files, which will be extracted in a semi-
automatic manner with the help of a machine learning PYTHON tool library available
on Tensorflow. The information extracted from these PCAP files having some unique
attributes such as Time (in min), Highest Protocol, TCP protocol, Source I.P. Address,
Destination I.P. Address, Source port, Destination port, Total Packet Length, City, Region,
Country, Latitude, Longitude, and Internet Service Provider. The large number of PCAP
files collected from the server will be converted into a large number of Excel sheets based
on the unique attributes. These Excel sheets consist of all the valuable information available
about the threat in the PCAP files, such as time spent on the network, location of their I.P.s,
and environment used by them while penetrating the server.
A large amount of information about the threats can be profiled based on their activi-
ties performed on the network or specific environment or Protocol used to achieve their
goal. We use all this information to extract all critical threat intelligence (CTI) from these
threats to determine the threats’ capability, opportunity, and motivation. This CTI can
also be used to identify the new threat in-network and extracted all information by taking
previously identified CTI as a reference. As shown in Figure 3, the motivation of these
threat agent groups can be calculated based on the environment used by them, the type of
activities executing during the process, factors responsible for digging information, and
data from the server.
In the first phase of the model, an algorithm was executed against the PCAP files
captured from the ESXi server and extracted the unique attributes from the PCAP files
I.P. addresses, such as time (in min), Highest Protocol, TCP protocol, Source I.P. Address,
Destination I.P. Address, Source port, Destination port, Total Packet Length, City, Region,
Country, Latitude, Longitude, and Internet Service Provider. When the model has all this
information about the attacker, the next phase model extracts the location of the threat
agents from where they generate the traffic in the network. The model considers only those
threat agents for location identification who have generated more than 1000 packets in the
network. The model considers the threshold point based on the level of skill or knowledge
the threat agent showing while traversing the network. Likewise, if considered less than
1000 packets generated I.P. address of threat agent, then the exploitation of vulnerable port
is significantly less or can be ignorable. It is the primary reason for a semi-automatic model
to provide the optimised time complexity for threat assessment of an organisation.
3.3.3. Opportunity
Similarly, opportunity can be calculated by identifying the number of open ports, the
number of protocols that have unrestricted access and would be vulnerable, and what
other factors help a hacker do unauthorised access to the server. The model will evaluate
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all this information by initialising the PCAP file captured by the model. The model will
determine the open ports with the help of various tools like NMAP, NS-LOOKUP, DIPScan,
etc. The combination of all the information about such attributes led to the evaluation of
the opportunity of the threat agent groups.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. State-of-the-Art Algorithms
Many different models are used to perform threat assessment for a network in an in-
formational environment on specialised datasets, where some of the datasets are discussed
in the previous section. Here, we illustrate all the threats identified in a network captured
during the penetration testing against the ESXi server of the University of Hertfordshire.
To provide an overview of the current state-of-the-art ML approaches used to perform the
threat assessment, we group all the identified threats from a network based on their profile
maintenance concerning the PYTHON program run against the DataStream/PCAP files
captured in the experiment. Similarly, the critical threat intelligence [26] feed is evaluated
from the group of threat agents based on their footprints extracted during the analysis
phase of the experiment. This overview is further divided into two main categories, i.e.,
traditional extraction of information from the PCAP files and machine learning techniques
applied on the information extracted from the PCAP files to generate the footprints used
by the threat agents during traversing network of the server.
The PYTHON script provides the accuracy and the unique attributes of the threat
agents for precision, false-positive rate (FPR), anomaly detection rate (ADR), and fault-
measure as initially reported [27]. Secondly, we calculated the performance of the threat
agent followed by our proposed three-dimensional metrics, i.e., motivation, opportunity,
and capability. Figure 4 shows that the input is an enormous number of heterogeneous
PCAP files captured during the experiment. The potential output generated with analysis
of PCAP files is the unique number of Excel sheets which consist of information about the
threat agents such as time (in min), Highest Protocol, TCP protocol, Source I.P. Address,
Destination I.P. Address, Source port, Destination port, Total Packet Length, City, Region,
Country, Latitude, Longitude, and Internet Service Provider. The specific attributes for
each experiment run against the PCAP files can be retrieved from https://github.com/
Gauravsbin/Excell-sheets-of-pcap-files-and-results-of-Threat-Assessment-analysis (ac-
cessed on 8 May 2021) [28]. Furthermore, with the help of these unique attributes, we can
determine the capability and opportunity of the threat agents [29]. Based on the footprints
followed by the threat agents during the analysis, we can determine the motivation factor
for attackers.
Some of the captured PCAP files were corrupted during the experiment, and the
PYTHON program list of crashed files generated during the investigation can be fetched as
shown in Figure 5. We also checked all these crashed files manually and with other analysis
tools. We found the same result that no information can be extracted from these files. There
may be some capture issue or the connection lost on the hacker’s end during the network
establishment. The time complexity to generate the unique I.P.s with information attributes
can also be evaluated from this experiment. This is the unique feature of this model as
compared to the existing model and methodologies. This could happen because of the
use of semi-automatic approaches for threat assessment of networks next to the real-time
informational environment.
4.2. Workflow and Comparative Experiments
As per the previous discussion, the output is generated in the form of Excel sheets
with the unique attribute of threat agents in a semi-automatic manner. So, to determine
the motivation, opportunity, and capability of threat agent groups, we applied machine
learning techniques on the previous phase’s output to provide a semi-automatic feature to
the model [30]. This novel approach helps us optimise the threat assessment’s complexity
against the network of influential organisations. This paper also shows the process of
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using ML libraries of PYTHON on TensorFlow and automatic techniques of the JUPYTER
notebook to identify the unique tuples of DataStream/PCAP files. This approach mainly
depends on the chronological order of packets in PCAP files. Here, we first make groups of
all the unique I.P.s extracted from raw PCAP files captured from the network with the help
of Wireshark. The grouping of all unique I.P.s based on their attributes and characteristic
features was identified during the analysis and implementation of DataStream.
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Similarly, the potential output generated in the previous phase is used as potential
input for the second phase of analysis and implementation. Such a process is known as the
profiling of threat agents. As in the previous stage, we generated the Excel sheet for each
captured PCAP file consist of helpful information like ports open. They are operating on
that layer: time spent on the network, location of the threat agent, etc.
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Based on this analysis, we make one more IPYNB file (Interactive Python Notebook)
known as the Jupyt r notebook. Jupyter is a free, open-sourc , interactive web tool known
as a comp tation l notebo k. Rese rchers can combine software code, c mputational
output, explanatory text, and multimedia resources in a single document. A Jupyter
Notebook document is a JSON document, following a versioned scheme, containing
an ordered list of input/output cells which can have code, text (using MARKDOWN),
mathematics, plots, and rich media, usually ending with the IPYNB extension [31–33]. This
file consists of an algorithm performing data clustering of Unique I.P.s found in the Excel
sheet of the previous phase. The data clusters of I.P.s form based on the number of I.P.s
facing a particular type of attack. This specific type of attack is determined based on the
number of factors identified during the analysis. The IPYNB file is collecting all the unique
I.P.s as input and extracting the information like on which layer they are operating, what
type of ports and protocols are compromised when they are attacking the source I.P.s of
end-users, and what information they extracted from the particular environment of the
V.M.s, etc. Based on the analysis, the model designed the group of all the threat agents into
particular categories concerning their attacking behaviours identified during the analysis.
Figures 6–8 show the histogram of the bar chart with the help of the IPYNB algorithm
for each Excel sheet generated during the first phase. Note that we have demonstrated
the experimental results of only three PCAP files, and similarly, we can show this for the
other PCAP file. There are two parts to the outputs generated by the. IPYNB file. In the
first part, three histograms are generated for every file in the output Excel sheet, and the
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second part develops the histograms on the cumulative data of all the files in the folder.
For every file in the output Excel sheet, three histograms have been generated, and all
these three histograms consist of common data at the y-axis, i.e., the number of unique I.P.s.
Figures 6a, 7a and 8a show the protocols being used by the attackers and the number of
unique I.P.s using these protocols. Figures 6b, 7b and 8b show the ports on the host targeted
and the number of unique I.P.s that targeted them. This histogram highlights the vulnerable
ports. Figures 6c, 7c and 8c show the time spent as a function of the number of unique
I.P.s. This histogram highlights how much time an attacker will usually spend to attack a
host. These histograms for the protocols, ports, and time spent on the network will help
evaluate the three main attributes for the threat agents, i.e., motivation, opportunity, and
capability. Once we identify the port open during the network access, we can determine
the opportunity for the groups of threat agents used during the penetration of the network.
In the same way, the above histograms will help us identify the protocols accessed by the
threat agents, evaluate the hacker’s potential capability, and level of skills acquired by
threat actors.
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in this analysis, the threat agents have primarily distributed denial of services (DDOS) type
of attacks.
Figure 9 histograms are based on the accumulated data in the potential output pro-
duced in the Excel sheets. They are used to represent the number of packets generated
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specific protocol for penetration of the network. For example, in Figure 8, the TCP protocol 
is used by most of the I.P.s and mainly targets the network layers. So, we can conclude 
that in this analysis, the threat agents have primarily distributed denial of services (DDOS) 
type of attacks. 
Figure 9 histograms are based on the accumulated data in the potential output pro-
duced in the Excel sheets. They are used to represent the number of packets generated for 
traffic during penetration testing, protocols, or layers being used by threat agents and tar-
geting vulnerable ports for achieving the goal. Figure 9a shows how many packets are 
sent to which port on the host machine, and Figure 9b shows the volume of packets for 
every Protocol used to attack the host. 
Figure 8. Experimental Results for P P file ( R 17.12.2014). (a) u ber of nique I.P.s vs. Protocol being used;
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igure 10 represents th histogram betw en the total data collec ed from each unique
I.P., whole time spent on the network, and protocols used to attack the network. Figure 10a
highlights the amount spent by the attacker for every Protocol used to attack the host. In
Figure 10b, the data points for time spent are highlighted in blue, whereas the data points
for total packets sent are highlighted in red. Even though these have different units, it gives
us a statistical relative visual of how the time spent by the attacker varies concerning the
number of packets sent for the same protocols used.
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5. Conclusions and Future Work
Threats and threat agent’s risks are emerging in threat assessment of a network for an
organisation and business of the companies. The security risk management practitioners
enable a mechanism to explore these risks and enforce their countermeasures based on
the threat agent profiling and determining the critical threat intelligence feed to them.
This paper presents a semi-automatic model based on the threat assessment of the PCAP
files captured by the semi-automatic featured tools during the penetration testing run
against the ESXi server of the University of Hertfordshire. The framework captured the
data between 2012 and 2019, which illustrates the value of assets stored on the server,
and the motivation, opportunity, and capability of the threat agents while accessing the
network. We evaluate the situational awareness data through this semi-automatic threat
assessment model by exploring the threat profiles for the historically captured data with
the aid tools. Furthermore, we provide the threat agent practitioners with an idea of
using an automatic model for threat assessment of a network. This research’s findings will
support decision makers, management, and software developer practitioners regarding the
building of threat agent profiling for their historical data. Critical Threat Intelligence feeds
for the threat agent’s groups might be helpful for the evaluation of new threats found in
the network. In the future, we aim to build an automatic machine learning–based threat
and vulnerability analysis security reference model as a security risk management tool
to evaluate the security needs of networks with sequential requirements of the next to
real-time informational environment.
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